The theory of theory-making

I've been to two workshops now at which the theory of theory-making is vigorously discussed.  It seems clear that even practicing scientists don't quite know how to define what makes something a "rule of life" or a "theoretical framework for neuroscience"-- myself included.
As such, I asked a philosopher at the recent Mathematical Biosciences Institute summit at Ohio State University to tell me how philosophers of science would define a theory.  He gave me six characteristics of a theory:

1. Falsifiability: most scientists would claim that this is the cornerstone of what makes a theory a theory.  However, this is a misleading characteristic.  If someone thought that they had discovered a violation of energy conservation, they'd probably identify a new form that energy could take so that energy conservation was preserved.  [Thanks to Feynman for that classic example.]
   
2. Accuracy: in my notes, I have written down "error bars", and I unfortunately can't remember for the life of me why I wrote that down.
3. Generality: this rules out things like "this particular animal happens to have a mole on her right cheek."  But how general is general enough?
4. Predictive: not just explanatory!
5. Explanatory: this is way easier than the predictive requirement.
6. Fruitfulness: the theory should yield new questions and areas of research.
   

Update: check out this paper about a theory of theories that I'm a co-author on!